To those suggesting the wrath of God

To suggest that an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent deity causes suffering in order to test the capacity of human beings to be compassionate is, on its face, obscene. In this case I refer to a definition of obscene as follows: 1) abhorrent to morality, or 2) repulsive by reason of crass disregard of moral or ethical principles, or perhaps 3) so excessive as to be offensive. It seems to me that such an argument can only be justified by a child-like need to explain that that cannot be adequately explained because it is beyond human comprehension—to find answers that transfer blame from human action to divine intervention. If we cannot ‘know’ God directly (think about Moses asking to see the face of God and being told that no one can see the face of God and live) then what can we know? When it comes to God, it occurs to me, not much. By describing God as omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent—all-powerful, all-knowing and compassionate—then aren’t we guilty of ascribing human attributes to that which we cannot describe? If God does indeed possess all three attributes and also possesses the attribute of intervention in human affairs, then God’s benevolence precludes an intervention that causes suffering. God, if God is really God, must not participate in an immoral or unethical act or the attribute of benevolence is no longer ascribable to God.

How about thinking about God as tout autre—wholly Other, ineffable, indescribable. If we think in these terms then we lose the ability to blame God for causing suffering. Furthermore we abandon the need support that blame by reaching for reasons to explain why God acts as God acts. If we simply ascribe a single attribute to the divine, that of benevolence and assume that other attributes exist but cannot be understood, then a case can be made that human beings have an ethical responsibility to act as the tout autre, as God in God’s place. This responsibility carries with it the Torah obligation to care for the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, to be of service, to allay the suffering of others even before one addresses one’s own suffering. When I read stories written by Primo Levy about his experiences at Auschwitz I am filled with a sense of ethical hope as Levy depicts how inmates, living in the most horrific of conditions, still managed to step outside of themselves, to be of service to others around them in order to alleviate the suffering of others even at a cost to their own well being. To my mind, this is an essentially Jewish response. Because we cannot know God, and we cannot describe God adequately, and we cannot ascribe motives to the acts of God we have the ethical obligation to act in God’s place in order to grow closer to the infinity that is God.